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security given for an antecedent debt requiring no concessions
from the holder 18
North Dakota, although having no case law on similar
factual situations, appears to follow the majority view that
conditional credit alone is insufficient for value. 19 "The law
should be progressive; it should advance with changing
conditions. It should also correct trends proceeding from
unsound results. '2 0 By accepting the view of the principle
case North Dakota courts would be providing justice to those
persons who deal with checks daily and apply them as payments and credits.
HARLAN K. HOLLY

NEGLIGENCE-CARE AS TO TRESPASSERS-LIABILITY OF LAND-

OWNER FOR MERE PASSIVE NEGLIGENCE-The two and one-half

year old plaintiff was severely injured in a fall from an
apartment window enclosed by a defective screen. When
injured he was living with the tenant contrary to the terms
of the tenant's lease with the defendants. This arrangement
was neither known to the defendants, nor in any way consented
to by them. The lease required the defendants to make all
repairs except those necessitated by damage caused by the
tenants. The United States Court of Appeals, D.C. Cir., held,
one judge dissenting, that although the plaintiff was a trespasser as a matter of law, and the defective screen was a
static condition, the plaintiff was well within the range of
foreseeability in terms of those persons to whom injury
might result from an unsafe screen. The terms of the lease
were not the outer limits of the defendants' vision. The
dissenting judge held that under the circumstances, the
defendants owed the plaintiff no duty with respect to the
screens since he was plainly a trespasser Gould v DeBeve,
330 F.2d 826 (D C. Cir 1964)
This case represents a trend toward increasing a land18. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-408.
19. See Dakota Transfer & Storage Co. v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
86 N.W.2d 639 (N.D. 1957).
20. Phillips v. Foster, 252 Iowa 1076, 109 N.W.2d 604 (1961).
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owner's liability and duty of care to trespassers.' In the
late nineteenth century a landowner owed a duty to trespassers only to refrain from willful and wanton misconduct.'
The courts reasoned that if an injured party had no right to
be on the property where the injury occurred, he was a
trespasser to whom, as a matter of law, the landowner
owed no duty 3 A landowner had a right to use his property
in any lawful manner he desired as long as he did not create
4
a nuisance.
One of the first departures from the strict common law
doctrine of "no liability to trespassers" occurred in the field
of trespassing children. By the early twentieth century the
status of child trespassers had changed considerably, mostly
by extending the application of the attractive nuisance doctrine.5 Even though this doctrine has been widely accepted,
the mere fact that the trespasser is a child does not impose
any duty upon the landowner to keep his premises safe where
the condition of the premises does not attract children.6 A
second departure from the common law doctrine occurred
when cases began holding that a landowner owed a reasonable
duty of care to trespassers for "active negligence ' ' 7 However, when a trespasser's injuries arise from static conditions
of the premises, courts have been more reluctant to impose
liability upon the landowner 8 Some cases have also held a
Imre
1.
See e.g., Krieger v. Ownership Corp., 270 F.2d 265 (3rd Cir. 1959)
v. Riegal Paper Corp., 43 N.J. Super. 289, 128 A.2d 498 (1957).
2.
E.g., O'Leary v. Brooks Elevator Co., 7 N.D. 554, 75 N.W 919 (1898). See
also, Hutson v. King, 95 Ga. 271, 22 S.E. 615 (1895)
Union Stockyard & Transit
Co. v. Rourke 10 Ill.App. 474 (1882)
Hargreaves v. Deacon, 25 Mich. 1 (1872).

3.

E.g., O'Leary v. Brooks Elevator Co., supra note 2.

4.

Trask v.

supra note 2.
5. "Where

Shotwell,

an owner

41 Minn. 66,

42

permits anything

N.W

699

(1899)

Hutson v.

King,

dangerous which Is attractive

to

children, and from which injury may be anticipated, to remain unguarded on
his premises, he will be liable if a child attracted to it is injured thereby." Foster
v. Lusk, 129 Ark. 1, 194 S.W 855 (1917).
6. Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Spence's Adm'r, 282 S.W.2d 826 (Ky. 1955),
Lewis v. Mains, 150 Me. 75, 104 A.2d 432 (1954).

7.

"Generally

speaking, the

term

'passive negligence'

denotes

negligence

which permits defects, obstacles or pitfalls to exist upon the premises, in other
words, negligence which causes dangers arising from the physical condition of
the land itself. Active Negligence' on the other hand, is negligence occurring
in connection with activities conducted on the premises, as for example, negli-

gence in the operation of machinery or of moving vehicles whereby a person
lawfully upon the premises is Injured." Potter Title & Trust Co. v. Young, 367
Pa. 239, 80 A.2d 76 (1951)
659, 213 P.2d 537 (1950).

8.

Boucher v.

American Bridge Co., 95 Cal. App. 2d

See Hume v. Hart, 109 Cal. App. 2d 614, 241 P.2d 25 (1952),

Levine v.
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landowner liable for damage resulting from highly dangerous
activity on land, which threatened the personal safety of
others, regardless of their status as invitees, licensees, or
trespassers.9
One court has said in criticism of the common law invitee,
licensee, trespasser trichotomySuch an approach requires a court to first determine the precise status of the visitor which is sometimes a most difficult task, and then to determine
from the cases whether the owner has violated any
duty owed to a member of such a class. Such an
approach is unrealistic, arbitrary, and inelastic. The
point where the duties towards members of each of
the classes begins or ends or where it should begin
or end, or becomes supplemented by the duty to act
is almost impossible of perception. 10
The jurisdictions which have discarded the common law
distinctions now apply a general negligence doctrine making
the landowner's duty of care dependent on the totality of the
circumstances.11 But, unlike the principle case, they are
still unwilling to apply a general negligence doctrine to cases
involving static conditions. 12 The prevailing view in cases
involving injury resulting from active conduct, as distinguished from a static condition, is that the landowner may be
liable for failure to exercise ordinary care toward a trespasser whose presence on the land is known or should
reasonably be known to him.' 3
It is the opinion of this writer that a departure from the
strict common law doctrine is warranted; however, extending
a landowner's duty of care to trespassers to include liability
for static conditions of the premises will put unreasonable
Miller, 218 Md. 74, 145 A.2d 418 (1958) , Richardson v. Whittier, 265 Mass. 478,
164 N.E. 384 (1929).
9. E.g.,.Wytupeck v. Camden, 25 N.J. 450, 136 A.2d 887 (1957) , Fernandez v.
American Bridge Co., 104 Cal. App. 2d 340, 231 P.2d 548 (1951).
10. Fernandez v. Consolidated Fisheries, 98 Cal. App. 2d 91, 219 P.2d 73, 76
(1950).
11. See e.g., Taylor v. Baton Rouge Sash & Door, Inc., 68 So. 2d 159 (La.
1953)
Fernandez v. Consolidated Fisheries, supra note 10.
12. E.g., Boucher v. American Bridge Co., supra note 7.
13. Oettinger v. Stewart, 24 Cal. 2d 133, 148 P.2d 19 (1944).
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restrictions on the landowner's use of his property
this extension should not be followed by this state.

Therefore,

EDWIN ODLAND

LIBEL

AND

SLANDER-EXEMPLARY

QUIREMENT OF ACTUAL DAMAGES-In

DAMAGES-THE

RE-

a libel action the trial

Court of Ramsey County ruled that the publication in issue
was libel per se. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff
assessing actual damages at $0 and punitive damages at
$5,000. Defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict was granted, and on appeal the Minnesota Supreme
Court held: punitive damages in a libel per se action are
recoverable in the absence of actual damages. Loftsgaarden
v Reiling, 126 N.W.2d 154 (Minn. 1964)
Generally, punitive damages are awarded where factors
aggravating the plaintiff's injury are present; those usually
considered are fraud, willfullness or wantonness, oppression,
malice, or violence.'
The great weight of authority requires actual or compensatory damages as a prerequisite to the recovery of
punitive or exemplary damages, 2 since the defendant may
not be punished for his wrongful conduct alone.3 Therefore,
there must be a separate cause of action for compensatory
damages, exemplary damages being mere incidents to that
cause of action. 4 More often than not, under this theory,
there must be an actual award of compensatory damages.,
North Dakota, along with the great weight of authority, deems
1.

OLECK,

DAMAGES

TO PERSONS

AND

PROPERTY

§

29

(rev.

ed.

1961).

2.
See e.g., Manhatten Credit Co. v. Skirvin, 228 Ark. 913, 311 S.W.2d 168
(1958)
Barber v. Iohl,
40 N.J. Super, 526, 123 A.2d 785 (App. Div. 1956)
Haydel v. Morton, 8 Cal. App. 2d 730, 48 P.2d 709 (1935).
3.
OLECK, op. Cit. supra note 1, § 275D.
4.
Tyra v. Board of Police & Fire Pension Comm'rs., 32 Cal. 2d 666, 197
P.2d 710 (1948).

5.

Manhatten Credit Co. v. Skirvin, supra note 2

actual and nominal

damages and holding

award of punitive damages).

(distinguishing between

that the latter will

not support an

